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The polls of the 2018 Quebec election forecasted a close race between the two leading 
parties. The result, a clear victory of the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) over the Parti 
Libéral du Québec (PLQ) was clearly at odds with the polls. We argue that when the 
polls get it wrong, it is important to determine whether it is a polling miss, that is, the 
discrepancy is due to changing voter behaviour, or a poll failure, that is, the problem 
stems from polling methodology. Our post-election poll shows that changing voter 
behaviour -- last minute shifts and the vote of non-disclosers -- explains most of the 
discrepancy. These movements varied by region. We conclude that the Quebec 2018 
election was among the worse polling misses in history but not necessarily a major poll 
failure. 
Les sondages de l’élection Québécoise de 2018 avaient annoncé une lutte serrée entre les 
deux principaux partis. Le résultat, une victoire décisive de la Coalition Avenir Québec 
(CAQ) aux dépens du Parti Liberal du Québec (PLQ), n’était clairement pas ce qui avait 
été anticipé. Nous soutenons que, lorsque les sondages se trompent, il est important de 
déterminer si l’écart entre les estimations des sondages et le vote est dû à un changement 
dans le comportement des électeurs ou à un échec des sondages eux-mêmes attribuable à 
la méthodologie utilisée. Notre sondage post-électoral montre que des changements dans 
le comportement des électeurs – changements de préférences de dernière minute et vote 
des discrets – expliquent la majeure partie des écarts dans cette élection. Ces mouvements 
varient toutefois selon les régions. Nous concluons que l’élection québécoise de 2018 se 
situe historiquement parmi les pires écarts entre les sondages et le vote mais ne peut pas 
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The results of the Quebec election held on October 1st 2018 came as a shock. All the polls 
conducted during the last week before the election had shown a close race between the 
Liberal Party of Quebec (PLQ – Parti Libéral du Québec) and the Coalition Avenir 
Québec (CAQ). The three main pollsters – Ipsos, Léger and Mainstreet -- estimated the 
difference between these parties at two percentage points or less. Three polls from other 
pollsters conducted during the last days of the campaign, two of them with small samples 
(n=500), had shown a larger margin (2.6-5 points). However, none of them came close to 
the election result, that is, a margin of 12.6 points. Therefore, media and academics alike 
spoke of the “worst score in the history of electoral polls in Quebec”. This would also be 
ranked among the worst in the world, including in recent elections in western countries 
(Jennings and Wlezien 2018), if we take only the polls conducted during the last week 
before the election. 
In this article, we make a distinction between polling miss and poll failure. We propose 
that three criteria need to be present to conclude to a poll failure. Using these criteria, we 
determine whether the Quebec 2018 election was indeed a poll failure. In order to do so, 
we rely on two sources of data. First, we analyze the estimates of the polls conducted 
during the campaign in order to assess the global performance of the polls. Second, we 
use the results of a re-contact survey conducted among respondents of the last pre-
electoral survey conducted by Ipsos in order to understand whether changes in voter 
behaviour may explain the performance of the polls. We analyze this poll both at the 
national and regional level in order to assess whether voter behaviour is similar across 
regions and contexts.  
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Polling miss or poll failure? 
“Poll failures” are not new. Some well-known cases have led to in-depth analyses that 
have been published in reports and major journals, starting with the U.S. 1948 election 
(Mosteller, 1949). More recently, the 1992 U.K. election (Jowell et al., 1993) and the 
2002 French Presidential election (Durand, Blais and Larochelle, 2004), in particular, 
were considered major shocks. Other cases – like the 1998 Quebec election (Durand and 
Blais, 1999; Durand, Blais and Vachon, 2001, 2002), the 2002 Hungarian election 
(Bodor, 2012) and the 2006 Italian election (Callegaro & Gasperoni, 2008) -- were less 
publicized.   
What are the common grounds that lead observers to conclude that there is a poll failure? 
There are two clear cases. First, and this is the most common situation, the winning side 
is not the one that the polls forecasted to win (U.S., 1948 and 2016, see Mosteller, 1949 
and Kennedy et al., 2016, 2017; Brexit, 2016, see Dunford and Kirk, 2016 and Duncan, 
2016; France 2002 1st round, see Durand et al., 2004; Australia, 2019, see Lewis, 2004). 
Second, the story told by the polls was not the one that occurred in the end, that is, the 
polls predicted a close race and the reverse happened or vice-versa (Quebec, 1998, see 
Durand et al., 2001, 2002; UK, 1992 and 2015, see Jowell et al., 1993 and Sturgis et al., 
2016, 2018; Hungary, 2002, see Bodor, 2012; Italy, 2006, see Callegaro and Gasperoni, 
2008; Chili, 2017, see Durand et al., 2018).  However, in some of these cases, analyses 
show no significant difference between the polls and the vote (Australia, 2019, U.S. 
2016, Brexit, 2016, for example). In other situations where the discrepancy between the 
polls and the vote is significant (UK 1997, see Curtice, 1997; France 2007, see Durand, 
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2008a, 2008b), the polling miss go undetected because the winner was accurately 
forecasted and the “story” corresponded to the results (Prosser and Mellon, 2018).  
 
These recent “failures” may have given the impression that polls have become less 
reliable. According to Jennings and Wlezien (2018) and Puleston (2017), this is not the 
case. In analyses of over 330 elections in more than 40 countries, they show that, on the 
contrary, poll error has decreased over the years.  
But what exactly is a poll failure? We suggest that the first criterion is that the polls 
significantly – statistically -- err in their prediction of the vote -- that is, the election 
results lie outside the polls’ margin of error or credibility interval (see: Baker et al., 2013, 
who suggest to use the term “credibility interval” when applying the traditional formula 
for the margin of error to polls conducted using non-probability samples).  
The “story” told by the polls leads to a second criterion. All or almost all the polls have 
to err in the same direction and at a similar level. This latter criterion is essential since it 
is because all the polls are telling the same story that the polls are blamed for having 
misled the population.  
We need a third criterion to conclude to a poll failure. The source of the error has to lie 
with the polls themselves, that is, their samples, methodology, weighting, likely voter 
models, question order, etc., which means that we have to rule out the possibility of a last 
minute shift among voters. Voter behaviour may indeed explain discrepancies. First, 
voters may change their mind late, after the last polls were conducted. Second, people 
who do not reveal their preferences -- the “discrete” or non-disclosers -- may 
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disproportionately vote for the party that appears underestimated by the polls. Third, 
those who finally do not show up to vote may disproportionately be supporters of the 
party that is overestimated by the polls. If we can show that such behaviour occurred at a 
level that explains the discrepancy, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the polls were 
right when they were conducted. Therefore, if we cannot rule out the possibility that voter 
behaviour is responsible for the discrepancy, we cannot conclude that the polls failed. 
If only the first criterion is met, that is, there are significant differences between some 
polls – but not all or most of them -- and the vote, we would call it a pollster failure and 
look for possible house or mode effects. If the two first criteria are met, that is, there is 
systematic poll bias (Prosser and Mellon, 2018), we conclude to a polling miss and we 
need to look for possible explanations, first in terms of voter behaviour. Finally, a poll 
failure is a systematic poll discrepancy that cannot be explained by voter behaviour. 
How can we determine whether voter behaviour is responsible for a polling miss? Our 
claim is that only post-electoral surveys among respondents of pre-election surveys can 
tell whether a late swing or differential non-response or turnout occurred. This type of 
analysis has been carried out in the UK 2015 (Sturgis et al., 2016, 2018) and Quebec 
1998 (Durand, Blais and Vachon, 2001) elections. In these cases, the authors concluded 
that voter behaviour did not significantly contribute to error and therefore went on 
looking for methodological explanations. Only in the UK 1970 election was a late 
campaign swing large enough to be considered the main reason for the polling 
discrepancy (Prosser and Mellon, 2018). In this paper, we examine whether the Quebec 
2018 election was a poll failure, that is, a situation where the three criteria – significant 
difference, generalized bias, absence of differential voter behaviour -- are met. 
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The 2018 Quebec election: A poll failure or a polling miss? 
We first examine the two criteria necessary to conclude to a polling miss, that is, a) 
whether there is a significant difference between the polls and the vote and b) whether all 
the polls erred in the same direction. We then use a re-contact survey to examine whether 
the third criterion is met, that is, whether late changes in voter behaviour or differential 
turnout explain the discrepancy.  
What do the campaign polls tell us? 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of vote intentions for the four main parties over the course 
of the campaign, as estimated using a local regression (Cleveland and Devlin, 1988; 
Loader, 1999; Jacoby, 2000). Support for the first three parties did not change much 
during the campaign. Movement occurred mostly for the fourth party, Québec Solidaire 
(QS), which increased its share of the vote from around 12 per cent to 17 per cent during 
the campaign. In addition, the distance between the two main parties appeared to 
decrease, thus narrowing the gap. 
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Figure 1. Support for the main political parties during the campaign. 
The polls forecasted the support for the CAQ at 33 per cent while it received 37.4 per 
cent of the vote. On the opposite, they estimated the support for the PLQ at 30 per cent 
and the party received 24.8 per cent of the vote. This was an unexpected result since, 
based on historical evidence, pollsters and researchers alike had come to expect an 
underestimation of the PLQ vote (Durand, 2002). However, support for the two other 
parties was almost perfectly estimated. This rings a bell since, if methodological factors 
were at play, we would need to explain why the error occurred only for the two main 
parties.  
The polls conducted during the last week of the campaign 
Six polls were conducted during the last week of the campaign and five of them – the 
exception is the Angus Reid poll -- were published during the campaign. The methods 
used are diverse. Léger and Angus Reid use their own web panels. Ipsos uses a mix of 
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telephone interviews (32%) and web (68%), relying on three different sources for the web 
sample. Mainstreet and Forum use Interactive Voice Response (IVR). Research Co. uses 
a web panel with samples provided by the Lucid platform.  
A number of measures have been proposed to summarize the level of discrepancy 
between the polls and the vote. Mosteller (1949) proposed eight different measures for 
the U.S. 1948 presidential election. Following Mitofsty (1998)’s recommendation, most 
researchers make sure to present the average of the absolute error (AAE) between the 
polls and the vote for the main candidates, M3 in Mosteller’s terms, for comparative 
purposes.  More recently, Martin, Traugott and Kennedy (2005) proposed a new measure, 
“A”, which is the log of the odds ratio of the estimated vote share of the two leading 
parties or candidates over their vote share in the election. This measure has two 
interesting properties: It is comparable between elections and it is signed in a way that 
gives an indication of the political bias of the polls (Martin et al., 2005; Callegaro and 
Gasperoni, 2008; Durand, 2008; Arzheimer and Evans, 2013; Wright, Farrar and Russel, 
2014). Besides, it may be generalized for multiple parties/candidates (A’, see Durand, 
2008; Arzheimer and Evans, 2013; Wright, Farrar and Russel, 2014). 
Table 1 shows that the five polls published during the last week of the campaign 
estimated the difference between the two leading parties, the CAQ and the PLQ, at 2.6 
points on average. There is no difference according to the methodology used. However, 
Start End Mode N total N disclosers CAQ PLQ PQ QS Others Diff CAQ-PLQ M3 A CAQ-PLQ A' for CAQ
Léger 24.09.2018 27.09.2018 Web 1502 1338 32.0 30.0 19.0 17.0 2.0 2.0 3.35 -0.346 -0.239
Ipsos 26.09.2018 28.09.2018 Tel & web 1250 1042 32.0 31.0 18.0 16.0 3.0 1.0 3.15 -0.379 -0.239
Mainstreet 26.09.2018 28.09.2018 IVR 2637 2501 30.7 28.7 19.8 17.1 3.7 2.0 3.58 -0.343 -0.299
Research.co 28.09.2018 30.09.2018 Web 625 550 33.0 30.0 18.0 16.0 3.0 3.0 2.65 -0.316 -0.193
Forum 30.09.2018 30.09.2018 IVR 1845* 1716 33.0 28.0 20.0 17.0 2.0 5.0 2.85 -0.247 -0.193
Average 24.09.2018 30.09.2018 Mean 1429 32.1 29.5 19.0 16.6 2.7 2.60 3.12 -0.326 -0.233
Angus-Reid 25.09.2018 30.09.2018 Web 635 502 32.0 25.0 18.0 20.0 5.0 7.0 2.60 -0.164 -0.239
Election results 01.10.2018 37.4 24.8 17.1 16.1 4.6 12.6
* estimated from information provided by the firm.
Table 1. Comparison between the last published polls and election results
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the two polls conducted during the last week-end of the campaign forecasted a larger gap, 
that is, 3 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. The Angus Reid poll estimated the gap at 7 
points and its estimation of the PLQ vote is perfect. The election results showed a 12.6-
point gap, significantly larger than any of the polls’ estimates. However, the fact that the 
last polls forecasted a larger gap may hint at possible movements at the end of the 
campaign.  
In order to compare likes with likes, we compare with elections where polls were 
conducted during the last week before the election. In the Quebec 2018 election, M3 
varies between 2.8 and 3.3 for an average of 3.1. In the 2015 U.K. election, considered a 
major polling miss, the average M3 statistic for the last week was 2.1 (Sturgis, 2016, 
2018). If we compare within Quebec, the statistic was 2.9 in 1998, a well-known poll 
failure (Durand and Blais, 1999; Durand et al., 2001, 2002).   
If we now turn to A– the log odds for CAQ over PLQ in the polls and in the election – it 
varies from -0.25 to -0.38 with a mean of -0.33. All measures are highly significant and 
they are all signed in the same direction, confirming the poll bias against the CAQ. 
Comparing with similar elections and taking only the polls conducted during the last 
week of the campaign, it was -0.17 for the Conservatives over Labour in the U.K. 2015 
election as well as for the PLQ over the PQ in the Quebec 1998 election.  
The A’ measure – the log odds of CAQ vs all the others – also shows a significant 
difference between the polls and the election outcome, against the CAQ. It varies 
between -.19 and -.30 for an average of -.23. In comparison, it was -.18 for the 
Conservatives in the U.K. 2015 election and -.15 for the PLQ in Quebec in 1998. The 
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performance of A’ in 2018 is better than that of the Quebec 1998 election because 
support for two of the four major parties was well estimated in 2018.  
In summary, all the measures lead to conclude to a major and significant error of the 
polls. This error is more substantial for the two leading parties and it is constant across 
polls. Therefore, our two first criteria, that is, the presence of a significant difference 
between the polls and the outcome and the fact that all the polls err in the same direction 
are met. We can conclude that we have a polling miss. We now need to check whether 
changing voter behaviour explains the discrepancy, that is, whether we have a poll 
failure. 
What does the re-contact survey tell us? 
Ipsos Canada conducted its last poll of the campaign between September 26 and 28 
among 1250 respondents using a data collection method combining web surveys (n=850) 
and telephone interviews (n=400).  Following the election, Ipsos cooperated with the 
authors to conduct a re-contact survey among respondents to the pre-election survey. The 
survey was short, with only 10 questions pertaining to voting behaviour, to the timing of 
the decision and to the reasons for vote choice. Two-thirds (67.4%) of the pre-election 
respondents completed the survey, for a total of 842 respondents, 250 from the telephone 
survey -- a cooperation rate of 62.5% -- and 492 from the web surveys (69.6%). The 
surveys were weighted separately according to age group, sex, region (post-stratified), 
years of schooling and mother tongue. Table A1 in the appendix compares unweighted 
and weighted pre and post-election respondents. It shows that, as in many surveys, the 
less educated and younger respondents were more difficult to reach. Younger respondents 
were even harder to contact in the post-election survey, which may have implications for 
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the estimation of the vote. However, these differences do not translate into a major 
difference between the unweighted and weighted samples in terms of voting intention and 
there is no significant difference between the post and pre-election surveys for any of the 
variables. The ratio of the highest to the lowest weight is rather high -- 16.9 and 17.3 in 
the pre and post electoral polls respectively. Part of it is due to the necessity to 
compensate for regional stratification. 
 
o Does changing voting behaviour explain the difference between the polls 
and the vote? 
Table 2 compares the pre-election estimates for the total and the post electoral samples 
with the election results and the post-election reported vote. While Ipsos, similarly to all 
other pollsters, anticipated a close race between the two leading political parties (see 
Table 1) in its last pre-election poll, its post-election re-contact poll estimates are much 
closer to the results. They give an exact estimation of the distance between the two 




We use these data to combine respondents’ answers to the pre-election and post-election 
surveys. Table 3 shows these pre-post patterns. Overall, 63 per cent of the respondents 
reported having voted for the party they intended to vote for. This is 78 per cent of all 
voting respondents. These stable respondents are distributed almost equally between 
CAQ voters, PLQ voters and voters for the other parties. We now turn to the three 
possible explanations relative to voter behaviour that may explain the polling 
discrepancy. First, 8.2 per cent of the respondents changed their mind and voted for a 
different party than the one they intended to vote for. More than half of those (56%) 









Sept. 26-28 Sept. 26-28 Oct. 1st Oct. 12-19
CAQ 31.9% 30.3% 37.4% 39.7%
PLQ 31.1% 31.6% 24.8% 28.0%
PQ 17.5% 17.5% 17.1% 15.1%
QS 16.4% 15.5% 16.1% 12.4%
Others 3.1% 5.0% 4.6% 4.7%
Weighted n 1015 686 673
Table 2  Ipsos estimates and the vote
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Second, 9.6 per cent of the respondents did not disclose any preference in the pre-election 
poll but declared a vote for a party after the election.  Again, the majority (55%) of these 
respondents reported having voted for CAQ. This is 5.3 per cent of the respondents (6.6% 
of the voters).  
Finally, the third possible explanation is differential turnout. Using aggregated data at the 
local level, Durand (2018) showed that turnout was particularly low in the ridings in the 
West Island of Montreal, where there is a concentration of non-French speakers and PLQ 
voters. However, the re-contact survey does not show that PLQ voters were more likely 
to stay home on election day.  
This suggests that last minute change of mind and the voting behaviour of non-disclosers 
explains in good part the discrepancy between the polls and the outcome. More than 30 
per cent of all declared CAQ voters (in the post-election survey) had reported a 
preference for another party or were undecided or discrete in the pre-election poll. 
Mtl Île Mtl Couronne Qc RMR ROQ
Total Voters only
Stable 64.1 59.9 77.1 59.5 62.9% 78.0%
- CAQ 21.8% 27.1%
- PLQ 19.4% 24.1%
- Others 21.7% 27.0%
Move to CAQ 2.0 9.5 2.9 2.5 4.6% 5.7%
Discrete to CAQ 1.5 6.0 1.9 8.6 5.3% 6.6%
Move to other parties3.5 4.8 1.9 3.2 3.6% 4.5%
Discrete to other parties4.0 5.2 1.9 4.7 4.3% 5.3%
Non-discrete twds no vote15.2 7.1 7.6 13.3 11.2%
Discrete twds no vote9.6 7.5 6.7 8.2 8.2%
Weighted n 833 672
Unweighted n 835 705
Turnout in election60.1 69.5 71.1 65.9 66.4%
Table 3. Patterns of pre-election and post-election answers
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Therefore, we can conclude that there was seemingly a large movement towards that 
party in the last days of the campaign.  
o Are respondents’ answers reliable?  
Could it be that people are not telling the truth and just pretend to have rallied behind the 
winner? This is a common explanation for polling discrepancies. Four pieces of 
information allow us to probe the reliability of our findings. We examine the 
respondents’ answers in the pre-election survey about how certain/uncertain they were 
about their vote choice as well as their expectations about who would win the election. 
We also look at their answers in the post-election survey about the timing of their 
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The first question that comes to mind is whether the respondents who declare having 
changed their mind were unsure about their decision when surveyed before the election. 
Only those who revealed a preference for a party get to answer this question. Over all, 
87.7% were absolutely (58.2%) or fairly (29.4%) sure of their choice in the pre-election 
poll. This is 89% among the respondents of the post-election poll. Figure 2 shows the 
answers to this question according to patterns of declaration. Shifting respondents and 
non-voters were much more likely to state that they were not sure of their choice (χ2 (10) 
= 108.1, p<.000). Between 3 and 7 per cent of stable voters for the different parties were 
not sure of their choice. On the contrary, defectors, whether to CAQ or to another party 
and decided respondents who did not vote, were not sure of their choice in proportions 
varying from 26 to more than 34 per cent. Therefore, those who changed were indeed 




Figure 3. Behaviour on election day according to perception of who is likely to win 
 
The pre-election survey also asked the Web respondents which party they thought would 
win the election. Close to two respondents out of five (38.8%) anticipated that CAQ 
would win the election. This is similar (39.6%) among post-election respondents. There 
are significant differences in expectations about who is likely to win (χ2 (16) = 344.8, 
p<.000), but this difference shows mostly among stable voters for the two leading parties 
who are more likely to think that their preferred party is going to win. Figure 3 shows that 
those who defected to CAQ were not more likely to think that CAQ would win the 
election than those who defected to other parties. The non-disclosers who decided for a 
party, whether CAQ or another party, are more likely to have said that they did not know 























































Figure 4. Pre-post patterns and timing of decision 
 
We also examined whether those who changed their minds or moved from discrete to a 
specific vote choice made their decision later than stable respondents. Over all, 21% of 
the respondents declared having decided during the last week-end before the election and 
15% on election day or even in the booth. We consider these respondents as late deciders. 
There is a significant difference between shifting and stable respondents (χ2 (8) = 86.1, 
p<.000). As illustrated in Figure 4, shifting respondents, non-disclosers who decided to 
vote and non-voters were all more likely to report having made their decision late. 
Among stable respondents, only 20 to 30 per cent decided late while among other 
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Figure 5. Reasons for reported vote according to pre-post patterns  
 
Finally, respondents were asked, in an open-ended question, what was the main reason 
for their vote. These answers were first coded by Ipsos and then verified by the authors. 
We focus on three categories: general appreciation of the party – I like the leader, the 
policies and so forth --, change government – get rid of the PLQ, time for change – and 
no answer/other reasons. The Chi square test for the difference between all the answers 
and behaviour is highly significant (χ2 (72) = 466, p<.000). Figure 5 illustrates that the 
main reason for the CAQ vote is undoubtedly appetite for change. However, stable CAQ 
voters were more likely to give this reason for their vote than the shifters or the non-
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All these tests indicate that the answers given by our respondents are consistent and 
reliable, that their reported vote is not the bare illustration of social desirability or 
willingness to declare having voted for the winner. 
Is changing voter behaviour similar in all regions? 
 
This section aims at better understanding and validating whether changing voter 
behaviour is responsible for the polling discrepancy. We examine whether the pre-post 
patterns of change are the same in the different regions of Québec. The election results at 
the regional level are estimated using the data available at the Directeur Général des 
Élections du Québec (DGEQ) with the same regional divisions used by the pollsters, that 
is: Island of Montreal, Montreal suburbs, Quebec City region and Rest of Quebec (ROQ). 
The Montreal Island is the metropolis. It is characterized by high urban concentration and 
cultural and ethnic diversity. The Montreal Suburbs constitute the rest of the greater 
Montreal region. Residents are mostly French-speaking. The Quebec City region is the 
seat of government. It is an urban area characterized by high homogeneity of French- 
speaking residents. Finally, the Rest of Quebec includes all the regions outside the two 
major cities. It is also mostly French-speaking. 
The Island of Montreal voted quite differently than the other regions. It is the only region 
where the PLQ received the plurality of the votes (43%) and it is also the region where 
QS got the largest proportion of the vote (22%).  In all the other regions, the CAQ was 
first with more than 40 per cent of the vote, the PLQ received around 20 per cent, and QS 
between 14 per cent and 17 per cent. The PQ received around 12 per cent of the vote on 
the Montreal Island and in the Quebec City region and around 20 per cent elsewhere. 
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Turnout on the Island of Montreal (60%) and in the rest of Quebec (66%) was lower than 
in the Montreal Suburbs (69%) and in the Quebec City region (71%).  
Table 4 shows the difference between voting intentions and reported vote on one side and 
the actual outcome on the other side, by region. It shows that the underestimation of CAQ 
comes solely from the suburbs of Montreal and the rest of Quebec. In both regions, there 
is a significant difference between voting intentions for CAQ and actual vote. As for the 
PLQ, its overestimation is concentrated in the greater Montreal area, that is, the Montreal 
Island and suburbs. The reported vote corrects the underestimation of the CAQ vote in 
the Montreal suburbs and in the rest of Quebec as well as the overestimation of the PLQ 
vote in the Montreal Suburbs. It does not correct the discrepancy between the estimates 
and the outcome on the Montreal Island. The underestimation of the QS vote in the post-
election poll is present in three out of four regions, which may be related to the difficulty 
to reach young voters. Finally, in the Quebec City region, the vote was well estimated in 
the pre-election and post-election surveys.  
What does this mean for movements between parties and from non-disclosers? As 
expected, there is a significant difference between regions (χ2 (24) = 104.4, p<.000). 





















CAQ -1.1% 0.4% -7.1% 3.2% 1.4% 1.5% -5.7% 3.2% -5.4% 1.6%
PLQ 8.9% 6.4% 8.7% -1.8% -3.3% -0.7% 1.5% 1.4% 6.3% 2.1%
PQ 2.2% 0.7% 0.3% -3.9% 3.2% -2.7% 0.2% -0.7% 0.5% -2.2%
QS -5.7% -7.2% 0.7% 0.0% -2.7% -4.5% 4.1% -4.5% 0.3% -3.3%
Others -4.3% -0.3% -2.6% 2.6% 1.5% 6.4% 0.0% 0.6% -1.5% 1.8%
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Weighted n 253 150 299 216 134 89 328 219 1014 674
Unweighted n 276 176 257 166 233 158 276 204 1042 704
Table 4. Comparison of  voting intentions, reported vote and election results
Montreal Island Montreal Suburbs Quebec City Region Rest of Quebec Total
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stability between voting intentions and the vote cast was higher in the Quebec City area, 
in favour of the CAQ, and on the Montreal Island, in favour of the PLQ.  
Movements towards the CAQ are more frequent in the Montreal suburbs and shifts from 
non-disclosers to vote for the CAQ were more likely in the rest of Quebec.  
 
We conclude that the patterns that we have seen at the national level do not translate in 
the same way in the different regions. The polls failed mostly in the regions where there 
were disproportionate movements towards the CAQ from decided or discrete 
respondents, that is, in the Montreal suburbs and the Rest of Quebec. In the Quebec City 
region, the polls were right from the beginning and on the Montreal Island they were 
wrong and stayed wrong. The bad estimation on the Montreal Island is not explained by 









Stable 64.1 59.9 77.1 59.5 62.9
- CAQ 9.6 23.4 34.3 24.5 21.8
- PLQ 35.3 13.1 17.1 14.7 19.4
- Others 19.2 23.4 25.7 20.5 21.7
Movement to CAQ 2.0 9.5 2.9 2.5 4.6
Discrete to CAQ 1.5 6.0 1.9 8.6 5.3
Movement to other parties 3.5 4.8 1.9 3.2 3.6
Discrete to other parties 4.0 5.2 1.9 4.7 4.3
Decided who did not vote 15.2 7.1 7.6 13.3 11.2
Discrete who did not vote 9.6 7.5 6.7 8.2 8.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Weighted n 198 252 105 278 833
Unweighted n 220 191 181 243 835
Turnout rate 60.1 69.5 71.1 65.9 66.4
Table 5. Regional patterns of change between pre electoral and the post-electoral polls 
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turnout. It goes in the same direction as the conclusion reached by Mellon and Prosser 
(2017) for the UK 2015 election concerning missing non-voters. 
Overall, we end up with three different situations. In the Quebec City region, there is no 
error of the polls. In the Montreal suburbs and in the rest of Quebec, there is a polling 
miss but no poll failure. However, the polling misses seem due to different shifts in voter 
behaviour in the two regions. Finally, on the Montreal Island, we conclude to a poll 
failure: both the pre-election and the post election polls show a significant discrepancy 
between the polls and the vote and no shift in the voter behaviour explains the difference. 
Conclusion 
Every polling error teaches us something about the polls’ possible biases and about the 
dynamics of electoral campaigns. Since polling methodology currently undergoes a major 
transformation and diversification (Prosser and Mellon, 2018), it is even more important 
to understand what happened in Quebec, whether the polls themselves or voter behaviour 
are the culprit for the polling error. 
We have shown that the Quebec 2018 election is a polling miss since the two essential 
criteria – a significant difference between the polls and the vote and a systematic bias 
from all the pollsters – are met. However, contrary to other elections (Quebec 1998 and 
UK 2015) where re-contact surveys were conducted to assess whether voter behaviour 
may explain the discrepancy, the Quebec 2018 election does not globally qualify as a poll 
failure. The difference between the polls and the vote is mostly explained by last minute 
movements towards the underestimated party combined with a tendency of non-
disclosers to vote disproportionately for that same party. We have also shown that there 
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are regional differences in these movements. This is a unique contribution since, to our 
knowledge, no other analysis of polling errors has examined regional patterns. These 
patterns lead to conclude that changing voter behaviour in two specific regions, outside 
the two major cities, explain most of the polling discrepancy. However, the estimates for 
the Montreal Island are off target before and after the election, which leads to think that 
methodological factors are at play, that is, the polls failed on the Montreal Island.  
The answers that respondents gave to other questions regarding the certainty and timing 
of their decision as well as the reasons for their reported vote choice corroborate our 
analyses. A will for change indeed characterized this election after 15 years of almost 
continuous PLQ government and the CAQ came to represent, especially in the last 
moments of the campaign, the vehicle for change.  
There are some limits to this analysis. First, we would have liked to have multiple re-
contact surveys in order to confirm our results. Sturgis et al. (2016, 2018), for example, 
could count on five re-contact surveys for their analysis of the UK 2015 election. 
However, the re-contact survey conducted by another firm, Leger360, is consistent with 
our findings (Léger, 2018). Second, a larger sample size and a better cooperation rate 
would also have been preferable.  
In a world of voter volatility, it seems that voters may decide on their vote at the last 
minute. We may of course attribute these changes to various events that occurred during 
the last days of the campaign, but this is a posteriori speculation. In such an environment, 
what are the pollsters supposed to do? How can they forecast the vote? The last Quebec 
election is full of lessons. First, pollsters should poll later in the campaign. Second, 
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pollsters and the media alike should inform the public that voter behaviour has become 
more difficult to predict.  
Finally, researchers have a dual responsibility. On the one hand, they need to stress that 
the polls are right most of the time, that they usually accurately forecast the outcome of 
an election. However, they also need to remind people that errors do occur, that polls 
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Appendix 1. Comparison of the pre and post electoral surveys 
  
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
n= 1250 1250 842 842
Mode
CATI_line 16.8 17.1 16.2 15.8
CATI_cell 15.2 16.4 12.2 13.9
WEB 68.0 66.5 71.6 70.4
Region
Montreal Island 25.2 23.7 26.1 23.6
Montreal rest of CMA 25.4 30.1 22.8 30.2
Quebec Region 21.7 12.5 21.6 12.5
South of St-Lawrence River 21.6 23.3 23.2 23.3
North of St-Lawrence River 6.2 10.4 6.3 10.4
Mother tongue
French 79.8 79.0 79.1 79.0
English 14.6 15.7 16.2 16.8
Other 5.4 5.3 4.6 4.1
Age Group
18-34 years old 19.7 26.0 16.7 26.0
35-54 years old 36.2 33.0 37.4 33.0
55 years old and over 44.1 41.0 45.8 41.0
Years of schooling
Less than HS diploma 5.6 11.2 4.5 8.6
HS diploma 15.4 29.8 16.7 32.4
Technical or college 34.4 27.0 33.1 26.8
University diploma 44.3 31.8 45.2 31.9
Income
Less than 20 000 $ 7.8 10.2 7.6 9.0
20 000 $ - 40 000 $ 17.3 21.9 18.8 23.7
40 000 - 60 000 $ 17.0 17.8 18.4 19.6
60 000 - 80 000 $ 13.7 12.9 13.1 11.8
80 000 - 100 000 $ 11.2 9.8 10.3 9.4
100 000 $ - 150 000 $ 14.3 11.5 14.0 11.2
150 000 $ and over 6.8 5.0 6.5 4.9
Non response 12.0 10.8 11.3 10.4
Children less than 18 years old 26.2 25.7 25.8 25.4
Vote intention including leaning
Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) 25.4 25.9 26.4 25.8
Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ) 26.5 25.2 27.2 24.7
Parti Québécois (PQ) 13.8 14.2 13.9 14.3
Québec solidaire (QS) 13.7 13.3 12.9 12.6
Another party 4.1 2.5 4.4 4.1
Would not vote/would cancel 5.0 5.8 5.2 6.7
Do not know, not sure 11.6 13.0 10.0 11.8
Weight Min 0.26 0.31
Weight Max 4.39 5.38
Max/Min 16.88 17.35
Post-electoralPre-electoral
Table A1. Comparison between pre-electoral and post-electoral respondents - 
recontact survey
